Archive for the ‘Predictions’ Category

Why Microsoft won’t do to tablets what they did to netbooks

A lot of early netbook models ran Linux, but over the last couple of years, Windows has emerged as dominant in the netbook market as it has traditionally been in the desktop/laptop markets. Could the same thing happen in the tablet market, once the ARM version of Windows starts shipping?

No.

It’s fairly clear that touch-based computing just doesn’t work very well with desktop user interfaces. Microsoft, however, still seems to be pretty much out to lunch about the idea that they need to provide a more appropriate UI. They’ve been selling tablets for 10 years, and they’ve made no serious attempt at this.

Microsoft’s primary strength in the market, with Windows, is application compatibility. Anything that significantly disrupts that, like requiring developers to design new UI, or even possibly just requiring them to compile for and test on a different architecture (like ARM) severely undermines the one big thing going for Windows.

Particularly in this instance, where Windows/ARM tablets, by the time they actually make it to market, will be competing against established competitors. There are already 60,000 iPad apps. How many apps were there that were optimized specifically for Linux netbooks? Essentially none. They ran the same desktop apps as other Linux systems, which end users just don’t seem to find especially compelling relative to Windows-based offerings.

Additionally, it’s very unlikely Microsoft has the guts to do anything like requiring developers to create new user interfaces if they want their apps to run on a hypothetical Windows/ARM tablet. Now, the geek brigade might not see a problem with giving users a ‘choice’ to run apps with non-optimized interfaces, but the real-world consequence of such permissiveness will be lots of half-assed ports that destroy the platform’s user experience.

Even worse, Microsoft probably lacks sufficient internal coordination for a full-court tablet push, if such a push requires the redesign of major Microsoft products across multiple divisions. See here, for instance.

When we were building the tablet PC in 2001, the vice president in charge of Office at the time decided he didn’t like the concept. The tablet required a stylus, and he much preferred keyboards to pens and thought our efforts doomed. To guarantee they were, he refused to modify the popular Office applications to work properly with the tablet.

OK, I assume Microsoft has gotten rid of that guy by now, but such problems appear endemic to Microsoft’s organizational culture, which is why you see Microsoft still chasing off in several different directions in the mobile space.

A Microsoft that was likely to be a serious competitor in the tablet space would have already announced a tablet operating system based on Windows Phone 7, and they’d have the confidence to back that system as their sole tablet platform. The Microsoft that exists in our world is still clinging to the notion of running desktop versions of Windows on tablets (despite a decade of market rejection — with this ARM announcement, it seems they’ve decided that was all Intel’s fault), and when it eventually does occur to them to do a tablet version of Windows Phone 7, they’re unlikely to have the level of commitment necessary to deliver the product they’d need to deliver to be relevant.

Of course if Ballmer goes, this whole assessment is right out the window. There are clearly a lot of talented people working for Microsoft. Microsoft’s vast resources, under the right leadership, could put Microsoft back in the tablet/smartphone game pretty fast.

Balmer Talks Tablets

See here.

Microsoft’s behavior here is entirely bizarre. They’ve been pushing desktop versions of Windows on tablets with absolutely no mass-market success for over a decade. Apple releases a tablet with a much more lightweight OS, with UI redesigned from the ground up for a touch device, and has instant mass market success.

And Microsoft’s announces that they’re taking this very seriously… and their response will be to keep pushing desktop versions of Windows on tablets, but… what? Hope that people notice this time because Apple got people paying attention to the tablet market?

Right, good luck with that. The reason people didn’t pay attention to those Windows tablets is because they sucked, and they’ll be perceived even more negatively now that there are better products on the market to compare them with.

Here’s how I see this going: some time in the next 18 months, Microsoft will finally come to terms with the fact that they’re barking up the wrong tree trying to stick a desktop version of Windows onto a tablet. They won’t actually abandon that approach, because internal corporate politics won’t let them and they lack the discipline to actually focus on things that matter. But they will announce an additional project to create a tablet versions of Windows Phone 7, which might even turn out to be a credible technical effort.

Only problem is, by the time that gets market, it’s going to be going up against the iPad, Android tablets, WebOS tablets, and the newly announced Blackberry tablet, some or all of which will be quite well established by then and will be on their second or third generation. And few or none of the value network effects Microsoft benefits from in the Windows market will do anything for them in the tablet market. So, basically, they’re screwed.

Google’s release of VP8 codec changes little

I’ve previously discussed the dustup over Ogg Theora vs. H.264. Today Google announced it is releasing the VP8 codec as open source. VP8 is an ostensibly patent-free codec which, unlike Theora, is said to be as good, technically, as H.264. But it won’t change much.

Most of the case against Theora didn’t come down to its technical quality, but the fact that H.264 is a standard that extends far beyond just web video on desktop platforms, and there was no way Theora plausibly had a chance in that larger world. The same logic applies to VP8.

The Mozilla Foundation and Google can implement VP8 in Firefox or Chrome or whatever. But let’s look at, say, Netflix. Right now, they can serve the same H.264 streams up to desktop platforms via Silverlight, to iPads (soon iPhones and iPod Touches), to the PS3, to the Nintendo Wii (as of this month), to Roku boxes, to the Xbox, to various Blu-ray players….

Most of those devices implement H.264 decoding in hardware, and their vendors couldn’t add VP8 decoding to them if they wanted to. And they mostly don’t want to, because H.264 licensing is pretty cheap, and they don’t care about the ideological arguments against it. It uses the same kind of licensing regime used by MPEG-2 (DVD), Audio CD, ATSC digital broadcast… the industry is very comfortable with this model.

So, what is a company like Netflix supposed to do? Keep two copies of its entire library, one in VP8, for Firefox, and one in H.264, for every other client platform in the world? Because the Mozilla Foundation has some ideological objections to software patents, and so refuses to implement H.264?

Right. Good luck with all that.

Had VP8 been around (and open source) five or six years ago, things might have been very different. But H.264 has already achieved critical mass. It simply won’t be displaced by another current-generation codec. If people want a patent-free codec to eventually emerge on top, they should start thinking about how to build a patent-free next generation codec, and get it ready for prime time before H.264′s inevitable MPEG-LA-licensed successor is ready.

Why the iPad is a big deal

In terms of long-term large-scale impact on consumer computing, the iPad is the most significant new computing platform to launch in over 20 years, with the possible exception of the Web, depending on your definitions. Really. Even if the iPad itself ultimately ends up as a minor player in the tablet market, it will likely be the device that takes tablets mainstream, like as the Mac did for the GUI. Why is this a big deal? It’s a big deal because this form factor has been anticipated for over 40 years both in fiction (see, for instance, 2001) and by human/computer interaction designers (see, for instance, the Dynabook), and will likely have a major impact on the shape of computing over the next couple of decades.

In terms of how users interact with computers, the iPad is the most significant thing since the mouse and the modern GUI. You could credit the iPhone for the multitouch revolution, of course, but I think the the phone form factor is just too limited to develop the full vocabulary required for touch-based UI to really come into its own. The iPad is the first platform that will enable that.

And there’s even a bit more to the iPad than that. The iPad isn’t just a new device built along the same model as traditional computers but with a new form factor and primary interaction mechanism. Put together the simple model lineup, the lack of focus on geeky tech specs, the elimination of the file system as a user-level concern, the system-level automatic application installation, removal, and updating… and the iPad is also clearly a major push toward the sort of appliance-like personal computing that many have tried for over the years, but none have previously achieved.

Now, I understand perfectly well that these kinds of predictions are easy to dismiss. That’s sort of the nature of the thing; if this were all obvious, there wouldn’t be much point in writing about it. But large chunks of the web get archived, and we’ll see in five or ten years just who saw what was coming, and who didn’t.

Apple sees iPad as major new platform

Unless you’ve been living in a cave that doesn’t get 3G reception, you’ve probably heard by now that Apple has a shiny new tablet called the iPad.

As far as I can see, the announcement does largely validate my earlier analysis. It’s not just a media player, it’s a device designed to do 75% of the useful things people do on the desktop computers, in a new and better way. And the long term goal of such a device can only be to try to shift the center of the computing universe away from Wintel.

There are specific indicators that this is what Apple is after.

  • iWork was announced along with the device. I said this would be a key early indicator. Creation of word processing, presentation and spreadsheet documents is the keystone of desktop computing. Isn’t the web more central to computing now? Yes, perhaps. But the web was already a multi-device platform; to the extent that the web is central to computing, that was already an example of the industry moving away from traditional desktop computing.

  • It runs iPhone apps. For some companies, this sort of compatibility would be taken for granted, but that’s not the case for Apple. iPhone apps are not going to provide the world’s best user experience on a device with a much larger screen. The typical Apple approach would have been to favor user interface purity over practical compatibility considerations. The fact that they went the practical route indicates they’re trying to remove as many barriers to adoption as possible.

  • The keyboard. I’m positive the optional external keyboard lies outside of Apple’s vision. As with the previous point, I think this is an example of Apple sacrificing its principles a bit to remove objections people would otherwise have to using the device.

  • The structure of the AT&T deal. Apple cut a deal with AT&T for reasonably priced wireless data services. But the iPad is only sold unsubsidized and unlocked, and even if you sign up for an AT&T plan, there’s no contract. Apple doesn’t want carrier lock-in to be a barrier to the adoption of this device, and doesn’t want to be beholden to outside parties for anything basic to the device. This kind of independence is essential to a flexible general purpose platform (imagine if Macs only worked with one kind of Internet access), and Apple probably had to negotiate pretty hard to get it.

More iPad analysis soon.

Jobs says tablet is most important thing he’s ever done?

Well, if this is true, it provides rather strong support for my speculation in the previous post….

Market Share, Tablets, and the Future of Computing

[Note for incoming readers: this post was written before the actual iPad annoucement, but the predictions were basically solid, so the analysis holds up perfectly well.]

Market share is, of course, the perennial issue in platform wars generally, and has been for a couple of decades now. The new IDC and Gartner reports released in the last couple of days have generated a lot of discussion about this again, but of course the issue never really goes away.

As one might expect after so long, most of the discourse with respect to market share has become formulaic and extremely boring. Windows advocates (those who actually have an argument, rather than just being mindless trolls, anyway) claim that low market share validates their criticism of Apple’s design and business decisions, while Mac advocates reply that quantity is not quality and that they have no reason to personally care.

But it’s worth occasionally giving the issue a serious look. I think it’s particularly worth it now, with the imminent announcement of an Apple tablet likely, for reasons that I’ll get to a bit later.

Desktop Intransigence

Apple, over the last few years, has been making the best products it has ever made and has built itself into one of the most valuable consumer brands in the world. These are not really disputable claims. On top of this, Microsoft’s OS development efforts have gone completely off the rails in the last decade.

Meanwhile, the usual Windows advocate and tech industry pundit explanations for Apple’s failure to gain market share in the computer industry (single-source hardware, no cheap low-end products, limited expansion options, etc.) completely fall apart in light of the fact that Apple does virtually the same things “wrong” in the phone and music player markets, and yet is extremely successful there.

So if all of this is true, why can’t Apple seem to get anywhere in the computer market?

A Brief History of the OS Wars

The only serious reading of the last 20 years of industry history, I think, is that Microsoft, by the mid-90s at the latest, had become completely entrenched in the desktop operating systems market. Windows reached a critical mass in terms of unit sales at precisely the right moment in history. Extremely strong value networks built up around the platform. Windows had the most software and peripheral support. Knowledge, both institutional and personal, started accumulating everywhere about how to use it in many different contexts. Before too long, everyone decided to run Windows because everyone else was running Windows.

Because of natural platform lock-in effects (helped along by Microsoft’s deliberate action, but that probably made little difference in the overall scheme of thing), other platforms have never, despite many attempts, been able to quite situate themselves in such a way as to benefit from those existing value networks. They’ve been on the outside ever since, and will continue to be. Windows is the standard.

There isn’t going to be some huge breakthrough for Apple in the desktop operating systems market. Ever. Regardless of what they do. They could license OS X to Dell and HP. They could make a $400 tower with six PCI-E slots and 8 drive bays. It might get them a few more points of market share, maybe — at a huge cost to revenue and profits.

Apple, of course, realizes this. This realization is the single best explanation for why Apple chooses to offer the specific computer models that it does, why Apple will never license OS X, why Apple just generally seems so much more aggressive with the iPod and the iPhone than with the Mac. Their strategy is designed to provide the most useful (and most profitable) products to a minority of the market, because they know they have no real shot at dislodging Microsoft. That door closed at least 15 years ago.

Core vs. Periphery

Now, about this time all of you Windows advocate types are getting really excited. “Ha!” you’re thinking, “We’ve finally got one of these Mac advocates to admit that Microsoft won!”

Well, not so fast. Microsoft is firmly entrenched in the desktop operating systems market, and will not be dislodged. But at the same time… well, look. Despite controlling more than 90% of the desktop computing market, Microsoft still somehow manages to be irrelevant to the future of computing. Microsoft holds the desktop OS market, which is still the center of the computing universe. But all of the innovation happens at the periphery, and Microsoft is like China has been for much of its history: a powerful empire perennially incapable of projecting power beyond its borders.

The companies defining the future of personal computing today, more than any others, are, in fact, Apple and Google. There are two frontiers here so far: the Web, and mobile devices. Apple is leading, with Google closely following, in the mobile device category. Google and Apple are both making heavy investments in the Web as a platform, Apple by pushing Web standards via WebKit and various other things still mostly below the radar (their massive new datacenter, various things they’re doing around client-side JavaScript libraries), and Google through its own WebKit derived platform, through its cloud apps, and soon through ChromeOS.

And then, of course, there’s the rumored tablet. Now, I’m about to head off into some wild speculation here. And it all might turn out to be wrong. I don’t pretend to have any special knowledge about what Apple is planning to do. And it’s possible the tablet is just going to be a media player and e-book reader, and not really all that interesting.

But I’ve watched Apple pretty closely for the entirety of the Jobs II era, and my gut tells me otherwise.

Signs and Portents

We’ve heard rumors — some of which look a fair bit like controlled leaks — that Apple has been working on an advanced vocabulary of multitouch gestures for the tablet. That they’ve been working on a tablet-based version of iWork. That the tablet pre-dated the iPhone — that all of this touch technology was developed for a tablet, and was co-opted for the iPhone because the tablet platform wasn’t ready yet, which means this device has probably been in development for at least five years.

We’ve also heard that iPhone OS updates have been delayed because of resources being pulled to the tablet project. There are some indications that Snow Leopard itself was delayed because of iPhone/tablet related development. And there’s the curious fact that Snow Leopard’s UI is virtually identical to Leopard’s despite the fact that, among other things, Apple completely rewrote the Finder, an obvious opportunity for a big UI overhaul that was passed up. We’ve also heard that Jobs is almost monomaniacally focused on the tablet project.

I think this is it.

I think this is going to be Apple’s attempt to redefine personal computing the way they did with the introduction of the Macintosh.

Leading Indicators

The key early indicator of this will be whether that iWork rumor is true. If this device is debuted with a multitouch version of iWork, it will be obvious that Apple intends to position it as a general purpose computing platform. If it debuts without iWork, it might be less obvious, but not necessarily something that could be immediately ruled out. In truth, it might actually be even more clever for Apple to use the tablet as a sort of trojan horse — present the thing as a media player, try to build a user base that way, and unfold a strategy to slowly turn it into a general purpose computing device over a period of years. We’ve seen with the iPod that Apple is capable of strategic long-term platform building that nobody really sees coming until it’s a done deal.

Mind you, even if Apple does take the direct approach, they’ll probably deny outright that the device is intended as a potential future replacement for a personal computer.

The Rematch

Either way, by creating a device situated outside of the paradigm of existing desktop operating systems, Apple would be doing an end-run around Microsoft’s desktop hegemony. Note that nobody expects the tablet to be positioned as a kind of Mac. This is key; being, say, the “MacTouch” would subject the tablet to the same sort of market share “cap” that the Mac has been subject to. (Though if the tablet took off as a general-purpose computing platform, one assumes it would inevitably have to merge with the Mac.)

While the risks here would be large and success would by no means be a sure thing, the mere attempt would be the most interesting thing to happen to the industry since, perhaps, the rise of the Internet. If successfully executed, such a ploy, which would be the first serious move against Microsoft since the return of Jobs, would give Apple a chance to re-fight the platform battle lost in the ’90s, probably from a much stronger position.

I guess we’ll find out. Though of course the ever-clueless Windows advocates and tech industry pundits — the same people who dismissed the iPhone by working their way down the spec sheet point by point — will deny that Apple is up to anything significant almost regardless of what gets announced.

Dell Mini 3 Smartphone

So, Dell has a new Android based phone.

We’re seen this sort of nonsense before, with the Dell Ditty (rhymes with…) music player. I predict this product will get essentially no market traction, and we’ll hear very little about it, except perhaps in a few years when there are some articles about how Dell is either exiting the smart phone market or rebranding/retooling its smart phones because nobody has been paying attention to them.

One of the reasons Apple is so successful is because the company has a very good understanding of its own strengths and weaknesses, and uses that understanding to determine what markets it can make valuable contributions in. Dell is atrociously awful at this. Instead, the company seems to feel a compulsion to enter every significant market, regardless of whether it has anything valuable to contribute there, apparently on the basis that being a serious player in the PC industry makes the company some kind of technology leader. (Microsoft often follows a very similar pattern.)